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New Evidence on the Motherhood Wage Gap 
 
Using data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, we assess the role of 
employment-based health insurance offers in explaining the motherhood wage gap. 
Researchers have been aware of the existence of a motherhood gap for many years; yet, the 
literature has failed to address the role of non-wage compensation in explaining the 
motherhood wage gap despite the increasing importance of non-wage benefits in total 
compensation packages. As hedonic wage theory suggests, mothers might view health 
benefits as desirable and trade-off wages for health insurance. Thus, lower wages for 
mothers might reflect their relative preferences for jobs offering health insurance. We 
estimate an endogenous switching wage equation model to account for the self-selection 
and, thus, endogeneity of having an employment-based health insurance offer. We find that, 
once the endogeneity of having an employment-based health insurance offer is accounted 
for, the motherhood wage gap disappears. 
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 1 
I. Introduction 
For many years, researchers have been aware of the so-called motherhood wage gap: the 
empirical fact that mothers earn less than non-mothers, even when relevant productivity factors 
are taken into account.  In this vein, Waldfogel (e.g., 1997) has estimated this gap in the range of 
5 to 15 percent.  Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel (2005) have shown that the motherhood wage 
penalty is experienced to a greater extent by lesser-educated mothers and that it can be mitigated 
by fertility delay.  Likewise, Anderson et al. (2002 and 2003) have discussed the importance of 
mothers’ education, along with their timing in returning to work post-childbirth, in explaining 
the motherhood wage penalty.  Yet, while there exists a vast literature examining differences in 
monetary wage compensation according to motherhood status, very little attention has been paid 
to the role played by non-wage benefits in explaining the motherhood wage penalty.  As hedonic 
wage theory suggests, mothers might view health benefits as desirable and, therefore, be willing 
to trade-off wages for the possibility of having health insurance coverage through their jobs.  
Thus, lower wages for mothers might reflect their preferences for non-wage compensation. 
Using NLSY79 data, we assess the trade-off between wages and the offer of 
employment-based health insurance coverage by motherhood status.  We estimate an 
endogenous switching model that allows for the stratification of wages according to whether the 
respondent receives an employment-based health insurance offer to assess the role played by 
non-wage benefits in explaining the motherhood wage gap.  In addition to accounting for a 
different wage structure in jobs depending on whether they offer health insurance, the model 
allows us to address the endogeneity of having an employment-based health insurance offer with 
respect to wages –partially originating in the self-selection of women into a particular type of 
job.  The analysis herein allows us to gauge the role played by non-wage compensation in the 2 
motherhood wage penalty and, as such, provides valuable insights into the sources of the 
motherhood wage gap. 
II.  Gender Differences and the Motherhood Wage Gap   
  Evidence of lower wages for mothers has been noted in the economics literature for 
nearly 30 years, starting with Hill (1979).  Current discussion of the motherhood wage gap is 
most appropriate given the trend noted by Waldfogel (1998) in the overall gender wage gap and 
the family wage gap component.  Specifically, she notes that, while the gender wage gap has 
fallen in recent years, the motherhood wage gap has actually increased.  Comparing the ratios of 
mean hourly wages by sex and motherhood status, Waldfogel reports that the ratio of non-
mothers’ wages to all men’s wages rose from 68.4 percent in 1978 to 81.3 percent in 1994, 
whereas the ratio of mothers’ wages to all men’s wages rose by less, from 62.5 percent to 73.4 
percent over the same period (Table 4, pg. 144).  Using regression techniques, Waldfogel shows 
that the role of family (i.e., marital and motherhood status) accounted for 35 percent of the 
gender wage gap in 1980 and increased to 56 percent of the gap in 1991 (pg. 148). 
  Researchers have offered a variety of explanations for the existence of this family wage 
gap, which is estimated to be in the range of 5 to 15 percent.
1  Waldfogel (1998) discusses three 
reasons: unobserved heterogeneity, discrimination, and institutional features of the labor market.  
Perhaps most important is the role of previous intermittent work in determining this gap, as 
incorporating direct measures of continuous work history reduces the estimated gap.  Anderson 
et al. (2003) note that work history explains a large portion of the motherhood wage gap.   
Likewise, this gap might also be reduced if labor market institutions in the United States were 
                                                 
1 In studies of the motherhood wage gap, researchers either model motherhood with a 0-1 
dummy variable or with two separate dummy variables, one indicating the presence of just one 
child in the family and one indicating two or more children in the family. 3 
more amenable to working mothers, as it appears to be the case in other developed countries.  
For example, Todd (2001) notes lower family gaps in European countries. Another explanation 
for the motherhood wage gap is one of reduced effort on the part of mothers; however, Anderson 
et al. (2002) reject this hypothesis as a major contributor to the gap.  Finally, Budig and England 
(2001) conclude that the most important likely contributors to the motherhood wage gap are 
diminished productivity and discrimination. 
  Numerous methodological concerns arise when deriving numerical estimates of the 
motherhood wage gap, including unobserved heterogeneity, selection into employment (as 
unobservables in this choice are likely highly correlated with the decision to become a mother), 
and endogeneity concerns with respect to experience, tenure, and motherhood status.  For 
instance, Waldfogel (1998) notes that unobserved heterogeneity may play a role in explaining the 
motherhood wage gap; thus suggesting the need to use panel data.  Yet, the use of panel data 
methods does not seem to eliminate the existence of a motherhood wage gap (e.g. Amuedo-
Dorantes and Kimmel 2005).  Neumark and Korenman (1992) go one step further and, after 
correcting for potential endogeneity issues, still produce a positive estimate of the motherhood 
wage gap.  Likewise, Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel (2005) estimate a variety of specifications, 
some of which correct for the endogeneity of motherhood, and still find evidence of the 
motherhood wage gap.   
Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel (2005) also document a puzzling finding.  They estimate 
the motherhood wage gap for women with different educational attainment and find that the 
regression-adjusted motherhood wage differential is actually positive for women with four or 
more years of post-high school education.  This wage boost at higher levels of education, which 4 
has also been documented by others in the literature,
2 is possibly based on mothers’ (or future 
mothers’) incentive to identify family friendly employers who offer benefits, such as flexible 
work schedules or generous maternity leaves.  By identifying these workplaces based on readily 
observable job characteristics, they are inadvertently choosing “female-friendly” employers less 
likely to discriminate against women.  As such, college-educated childless women may be, in 
comparison, doing themselves a disservice by avoiding family-friendly employers, resulting in 
lower wages than college-educated mothers, ceteris paribus. 
III.    The Role of Non-wage Compensation in Explaining Wage Gaps   
  The literature on the gender and motherhood wage gap has primarily focused on earnings 
and, significantly less, on non-wage benefits.  The exclusion of non-wage benefits in the 
discussion of the gender and, in particular, the motherhood wage gap has become more 
problematic in recent years as the percentage of total compensation captured by wages has 
declined to approximately 71.4 percent in the year 2003 (Levy, pg. 15, 2006) from 95.1 percent 
in 1966 (Woodbury, pg. 166, 1983).  Thus, non-wage benefits are playing an ever bigger role in 
workers’ compensation packages.  Clearly, factors other than wages are important determinants 
of total compensation, suggesting that they are likely to also play an important role in the 
worker/job sorting process.  The theory of compensating wage differentials asserts that workers 
(and firms) trade-off wage and non-wage benefits when searching for the optimal job offer 
package.
3  However, empirical evidence of such trade-offs using micro-level data has been 
inconsistent at best.   
                                                 
2 See, for example, Taniguchi (1999), Todd (2001) and Blackburn et al. (1990). 
3 Woodbury (1983) develops a theoretical model to test the willingness and ability of workers to 
trade wage and non-wage benefits in the total compensation package.  He finds that wages and 
fringes are substituted in the total compensation package with ease.  Likewise, B.K. Atrostic 5 
A variety of studies have examined the role played by non-wage benefits on wage gaps.  
For example, Filer (1985) presents an early look at the role of compensating wage differentials in 
explaining gender wage gaps, with a focus on non-pecuniary job characteristics such as task 
redundancy, prospects for promotion, and job hazards.  He does not focus directly on health 
insurance benefits, preferring instead to include monetarily measurable benefits in his measure of 
compensation.  Filer’s results show a 24 percent reduction in the female “wage penalty” when 
this hedonic model is incorporated. 
More recently, a variety of studies have directly addressed the role played by health 
benefits in explaining wage gaps among all workers.  In this regard, Gruber (1994) relies on the 
exogenous differential timing across states in the passage of laws mandating that employer-
provided health plans cover pregnancy-related costs to identify a wage-fringe trade-off.  He finds 
that workers most likely to benefit from these laws did earn lower wages.  Likewise, Currie and 
Madrian (1999), in their extensive review of the health insurance and labor markets, discuss the 
existing evidence on the relationship between wages and health insurance in the labor market.  
They argue that relying on firm-level data will reveal a positive relationship between wages and 
fringes because higher productivity workers tend to be paid higher wages and receive more 
generous fringe benefits.  In other words, the labor market consists of “good” jobs and “bad” 
jobs.  Using individual-level data with appropriate controls for ability can reduce this statistical 
problem.  However, the use of panel data may not totally circumvent the remaining omitted 
ability bias.  To the extent that some of the variability in fringe benefits is due to job changes, 
treatment of the job change mechanism and the wage-fringe trade-off becomes important.   
Monheit and Vistnes (1999) seem in agreement with Currie and Madrian, finding evidence of 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1982) makes an important contribution to this literature, focusing on non-pecuniary non-wage 
benefits (such as on-the-job risk or physical comfort). 6 
individual worker preferences for health insurance driving worker sorting into jobs with and 
without such offers, but Lehrer and Pereira (2007) find no evidence of a health insurance 
compensating differential in their study of displaced workers.     
There has been some success in recent years in establishing empirically a wage-fringe 
trade-off by researchers focusing on narrower groups of workers.  Adams (2007) addresses the 
difficulty of dealing with the “good jobs versus bad jobs” problem by focusing on older workers 
in New York State during a period of policy transition.
4  The new policy only allowed for 
regional differences in health care costs to be considered when setting health insurance 
premiums, while risk factors, such as age, could no longer be incorporated in the calculation of 
such premiums.  The focus on older workers is particularly useful because age is an extremely 
easy-to-identify risk factor associated with higher health expenditures.  Thus, if age is eliminated 
from the legal criteria that can be used to set insurance premiums, one would expect older 
workers’ wages to decrease when workers and firms trade-off wage and non-wage benefits.
5  We 
modify Adams’ approach in two ways.  First, he relies on CPS data, but the CPS reports only 
actual employer-provided health insurance coverage.  We, instead, focus on employer-provided 
health insurance offers.  These two concepts may vary in some systematic way due to individual 
differences in the incentive to take-up coverage.  Second, we consider the likely endogeneity of 
health insurance coverage.   
Focused on gender wage differentials, recent research has incorporated health insurance 
coverage information in studies of the gender wage gap.  For example, Levy (2006) presents a 
detailed examination of the role played by health insurance in the gender wage gap, including 
                                                 
4 Sheiner (1999), focusing on older workers, also finds results that support the notion of a wage-
fringe trade-off. 
5 Adams (2007) explains the difficulty in explaining the wage-age profile because of evidence 
that the steep upward slope of this profile results from more than returns to experience. 7 
specific attention to employer health insurance offers, workers’ eligibility for such offers, and 
finally, worker take-up of coverage.  Levy concludes that measuring the gender compensation 
gap including health insurance coverage would reduce estimates of sex compensation inequality.  
Her findings indicate the importance of broadening gender compensation gap studies to address 
more than just wage differentials.  In contrast, McCrate (2005) examines non-wage job 
characteristic of flexible work schedules; but only finds weak support for compensating 
differentials as an explanation for the gender wage gap.   
Only recently have researchers begun to explore the possibility of an explicit link 
between the motherhood wage gap and employers’ provision of a variety of family-friendly 
benefits (other than health care insurance).  In this vein, Felfe (2007) examines job changes 
surrounding a mother’s birth of her first child and explains that there are some systematic 
patterns in benefit changes associated with childbirth.  She argues that direct evidence of this 
trade-off can be found in her estimated wage regressions, which include family-friendly job 
characteristics as exogenous regressors.  However, because of the likely endogeneity of these 
benefits, this evidence remains only suggestive.  In fact, also focusing on the motherhood wage 
gap, Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel (2005) are unable to find evidence of a compensating wage 
differential.  Instead, they uncover a positive correlation between family-friendly benefits and 
wages, which could be due to a possible link between an employer’s provision of family-friendly 
benefits and female-friendly management.       
To our knowledge, the best approach to examining whether mothers accept lower wages 
in order to attain jobs in more family-friendly workplaces is found in Nielsen et al. (2004).
6  In 
                                                 
6 Budig and England (2001) include family-friendly job characteristics in their estimation to 
address the role of compensating differentials in producing the motherhood wage gap and find 8 
this paper, the authors note that the public sector in Sweden is well-known for its relatively 
generous non-wage benefits and lower pay rates.  They test the existence of a compensating 
wage differential among mothers by means of an endogenous switching model in which the 
observed switching mechanism is the choice of private versus public sector.  Our approach 
differs in our choice to focus directly on a specific family-friendly job characteristic (namely, the 
health insurance offer) rather than on a more indirect set of job characteristics embedded in 
public sector employment.  After all, in the U.S., public sector employment is only loosely 
associated at best with non-wage benefits (i.e., not all public sector jobs are “good” jobs).   
IV. Data   
  We draw our data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79).  We 
use a non-balanced panel of women that, as of 2004, contained approximately 1,839 women 
employed in the private sector.  The best measure of health insurance coverage for this 
estimation would be the precise dollar value of the offered health benefit package, information 
unavailable in most survey data sets.  However, the NLSY data contain a self-reported variable 
that equals one if the worker has health insurance available from her employer.  Using this 
information to construct our dummy variable indicator for the employer offer of health insurance 
coverage reveals that approximately 78 percent of working women in our sample had an 
employer health insurance offer as of 2004.  This health insurance coverage offer is distinct from 
actual coverage, which, in addition, reflects a take-up decision.  This distinction is important 
since, as noted by Levy (2006), women are much more likely than men to decline employer 
offers of health insurance coverage.  
                                                                                                                                                             
that these characteristics are not associated with the lower wages earned by mothers.  Their 
approach, however, does not address the endogeneity of these job features. 9 
Table 1 provides some of these women’s characteristics according to whether or not they 
were offered health insurance through their employers.  As it is typically the case with other 
datasets, women with health care insurance offers earned substantially more per hour than their 
counterparts lacking such offers ($9.68 versus $5.87), reflecting the good job versus bad job 
heterogeneity discussed earlier.  Their ages are quite similar, with an average of approximately 
43 years, as is also their racial distribution.  Perhaps one of the most interesting facts is that a 
higher percentage of women lacking a health insurance offer through their employer display 
health related work limitations.  Not surprisingly, the lack of an employer health insurance offer 
is more prominent among less educated women, with less tenure in their jobs, and with fewer 
skills as reflected by their occupations.  Finally, working women in urban areas appear slightly 
less likely to lack health insurance through their employers.   
To provide further descriptive evidence of the motherhood wage gap, we present in Table 
2 calculations of the relative impact of receiving a health insurance offer on the motherhood 
wage gap.  This estimate is calculated by: 
(1)  2 () ( ) AB A B
Non mothers Non mothers Mothers Mothers ww w w HCI −− Δ= − − −        
where wj
i, is the log real hourly wage earned by group j when belonging to a particular type of 
job i (A = jobs offering health insurance, B = jobs not offering health insurance).  From the 
calculations in Table 2, it is clear that wages differ by motherhood status only for those mothers 
in jobs with health insurance offers, whereas they do not among mothers lacking this non-wage 
benefit.  As a result, the motherhood wage gap among women with employer-based health 
insurance offers is 13 percentage points larger than among their counterparts lacking such job 
benefit.  This descriptive evidence is consistent with the compensating wage differential story of 10 
the motherhood wage gap and persists even when we use an alternative definition of motherhood 
to differentiate between mothers with one kid versus mothers with two or more children.   
At any rate, it is worth noting that the double difference estimate from the above 
calculation is based on the assumption that women with and without employer-based health 
insurance offers are similar.  Yet, we know that they may differ in some respects.  Therefore, an 
alternative estimate that adjusts for the selection into jobs offering employer-based health 
insurance as well as for other differences in observable characteristics is discussed in the 
following section. 
V. Methodology   
  Our interest is to examine the potential role of having a health insurance offer from the 
employer in explaining the motherhood wage gap.  With that purpose in mind, we could estimate 
the following model: 
(2)      ( ) i i i i i i i hi mom hi mom X w ε ϕ φ δ β + + + + = * ln        
where  X would be a vector of human capital descriptors, job characteristics, and regional 
controls.  The variable mom would equal 1 if the woman is a mother and zero otherwise, whereas 
hi would equal 1 if the worker received a health insurance offer from her employer.  The 
parameterδ would capture the motherhood wage gap for mothers lacking employment-based 
health insurance offers, φ would denote the extent to which non-mothers trade wages for health 
insurance offers at work, and the sum (φ+ϕ) would capture the motherhood wage gap among 
women who have been offered health insurance coverage through their jobs.  Note, however, that 
the estimates in equation (2) would be biased for three reasons.  First, hedonic wage theory 
suggests that women may self-select themselves into a particular job depending on their 
preference for wage versus non-wage compensation.  Second, wages and health insurance offers 11 
made by employers are likely to be determined jointly and, as such, having a health insurance 
offer is likely to be endogenous to wages.  Endogeneity of a health insurance offer can also occur 
if unobserved characteristics influencing the likelihood of receiving a health insurance offer also 
affect the wage earned once employed.  A third problem with specification (2) is the possible 
existence of a differing wage structure for women in “good” jobs offering health insurance 
versus women in “bad” jobs lacking any health insurance offer, as argued by segmented labor 
market theory. 
  In order to address the aforementioned limitations, we estimate an endogenous switching 
model that examines the wage earned by women in two separate equations according to whether 
or not they received a health insurance offer from their employer (Maddala 1983).  In addition to 
allowing for a different wage structure depending on whether the job offers health insurance or 
not, we are able to model women’s self-selection into jobs offering health insurance and, as such, 
the endogeneity of having a health insurance offer from the employer with respect to wages.  
Neglecting this self-selection of women into specific jobs and, thus, the endogeneity of having a 
health insurance offer, would yield biased estimates of the importance of non-wage benefits in 
the motherhood wage gap.  Our full model would thus be given by:    
(3)  i i i i mom X w 1 1 1 1 ln ε δ β + + =  if 
* 0 i hi > , and 
(4)  i i i i mom X w 2 2 2 2 ln ε δ β + + =  if 
* 0 i hi ≤ , where:      
(5) 
* 10 ii i i Ii f h i Z θν == + >  and 
* 00 ii i i Ii f h i Z θν = =+ ≤      
The vector: 
*
i hi  is the latent variable that determines whether a particular female employee is 
hired by an employer who offers her health insurance coverage.  What we observe, however, is 
the dichotomous variable:  1 = i I if 
* 0 i hi > and 0 = i I otherwise.  The vector  i w1  represents the 12 
wage earned by woman iworking for an employer who offers health insurance, whereas  i w2  is 
the wage earned by woman iworking for an employer who does not offers health insurance.  The 
error terms in equations (3) through (5) are assumed to have a trivariate normal distribution with 
mean vector zero and a covariance matrix where the covariance between  i 1 ε  and  i 2 ε  is not 
defined as we never observe both  i w1  and  i w2  for a given individual.  Therefore, as explained by 
Lokshin and Sajaia (2004), the model is identified by definition through these nonlinearities.   
Yet, to improve the identification, the vector Z includes all the characteristics thought to 
affect wages based on typical Mincer’s type specification (Mincer and Polachek, 1974) included 
in  X , as well as a variable indicating the percentage of jobholders in the household.  The 
fraction of jobholders in the household serves as an identifier for the equation modeling the 
likelihood of having a job that offers health insurance as we expect that variable to influence the 
respondent’s choice of a job with or without health insurance, but not her/his wages.
7  We, 
nonetheless, check the correlation of our instrument with the individual’s choice of a job that 
offers health insurance –the endogenous regressor to be instrumented.  The problem of “weak 
instruments” arises when either the instruments are weakly correlated with the endogenous 
regressor or the number of IVs is too large (Angrist and Krueger 2001).  A simple F-test 
indicates that our IV is strongly correlated to the likelihood of being offered health insurance.
8  
Finally, because the likelihood of choosing a job that offers health insurance is being 
instrumented by one variable, we do not make use of over-identification tests to examine the 
                                                 
7 This variable has also been used in other studies as a valid instrument for the choice of job 
made by respondents, e.g. Lokshin and Sajaia (2004). 
8 The F-test is given by: F (1, 19695) = 10.96, with Prob > F = 0.0009 when we do not 
distinguish how many children the mother has (i.e. we simply include a motherhood dummy) and 
by: F (1, 19694) = 6.13 with               Prob > F = 0.0133 when we do (i.e. when we include 
dummies indicative of whether the mother has one child or two or more children). 13 
exogeneity of our instrument.
9  To the extent that these tests have relatively low power in case of 
general misspecifications (e.g. Newey 1985) and serve to examine the exogeneity of each one of 
our instruments conditional on the other ones being valid, we defend our choice of instrument on 
theoretical reasons.  In particular, based on human capital theory, wages are explained by human 
capital descriptors and other individual characteristics of the respondent following Mincer and 
Polachek’s (1974) seminal work, but not by characteristics of other household members (i.e. who 
works and who does not), which are more likely to play a role in the individual’s work decision 
instead, e.g. the likelihood of choosing a job that offers health insurance.   
  Equations (3)-(5) are estimated simultaneously through a full-information maximum 
likelihood method, making it possible to test with more clarity whether the motherhood wage 
gap is different for women with employer health insurance offers relative to women without such 
offers.  A priori, we expect the motherhood wage gap to be larger for mothers who received 
health insurance offers at work; in other words, we would expect to see that: |δ1|>|δ2|.    
Incorporating the endogenous switching mechanism ought to have a substantial impact on 
estimates of the motherhood wage gap, as was found by Nielsen et al. (2004).  Their estimation 
of the public versus private sector motherhood wage gap (akin to our analysis of the motherhood 
wage gap between women with health insurance coverage offers and those without) produced an 
estimated motherhood wage gap of 2.4 percent in the public sector and no statistically significant 
gap in the private sector.  Incorporating the endogenous switching regression mechanism, public 
sector mothers received a child premium of 3 percent, whereas private sector mothers 
experienced a child penalty of 6 percent.   
VI. Results   
                                                 
9 Nielsen et al. (2004) also rely on a single instrument in their endogenous (sector-specific) 
switching wage regression model. 14 
A) Baseline  Estimates   
Baseline estimation results of the motherhood wage gap are displayed in Table 3.  This 
table presents the motherhood wage penalty resulting from a log wage regression estimated in 
three ways, measuring motherhood in two different ways.
10 First, we estimate a simple ordinary 
least squares regression of the logarithm of wages earned by all working women, regardless of 
whether or not they are offered health insurance by their employers.  This estimate is a 
replication of much previous research and serves as a point of comparison from which to start 
our discussion.  The estimated motherhood wage gap from such a model in Panel A, Table 3, is 
approximately 6 percent, with the motherhood penalty associated with one child versus two or 
more children equaling 3 percent and 7 percent, respectively.  These estimates fall well within 
the range reported in the existing literature.
11 
Subsequently, focusing on the question at hand in this paper, we stratify our sample of 
working women according to whether or not they are offered health insurance by their 
employers.  Using these two sub-samples, we re-estimate the log wage regression in Panel A of 
Table 4.  These results are displayed in Panels B and C of Table 3.  Looking first at women with 
employment-based health insurance offers (Panel C), we see that mothers earn lower wages than 
non-mothers, based both on the single motherhood dummy variable and the combination dummy 
variables for motherhood.  However, the evidence of a motherhood wage gap among working 
women lacking employment-based health insurance offers (Panel B) is much weaker.  It is only 
                                                 
10 Complete regression results from these baseline estimations are available from the authors 
upon request. 
11 Because there is no single norm in the literature regarding the measurement of motherhood, we 
report estimates throughout our analyses using two separate sets of regressions which rely on two 
different measurements of motherhood.  The first is a single 0-1 dummy variable indicating 
motherhood, while the second is actual a combination of two dummy variables, the first 
indicating the presence of a single child in the family and the second indicating two or more 
children in the family. 15 
when we distinguish according to whether mothers have had one or two plus children that we 
find some evidence of a statistically significant (at the 5 percent level) motherhood wage gap.  
Specifically, mothers with two or more children lacking employment-based health insurance 
offers earn approximately 4.6 percent less than similar non-mothers, ceteris paribus.  In contrast, 
among women with employment-based health insurance offers in Panel C, mothers earn an 
average of 5 percent less than non-mothers, with the wage penalties associated to having one and 
two plus children averaging out 4 percent and 6 percent, respectively.   
In sum, from this simple regression approach, it appears that there exists a clear trade-off 
between wages and having an employment-based health insurance offer for mothers receiving 
such benefits, with the common estimates of the motherhood wage gap found in the existing 
literature being driven by the wage gap for mothers with employment-based health insurance 
offers.  However, owing to endogeneity problems emerging, in part, from the self-selection of 
women into particular type of jobs, as well as owing to the different wage structure associated 
with jobs according to whether or not they offer health insurance, we turn to a more rigorous 
econometric analysis of the problem at hand.   
B)  Estimates from the Endogenous Switching Regression Model  
Results from the endogenous switching regression model described in equations (3) 
through (5) are displayed in Tables 4 and 5, which only differ in how motherhood is measured.  
Our estimation approach in both tables corrects the standard errors to account for clustering at 
the individual level.  Additionally, while the models are identified by definition through 
nonlinearities (see Lokshin and Sajaia, 2004), the health insurance offer equation includes all the 
characteristics thought to affect wages along with a variable indicative of the percentage of 
jobholders in the respondent’s household to improve identification.  Note that the coefficient 16 
associated with this instrument is positive, suggesting positive assortative mating, i.e., 
individuals likely to receive employer-provided health insurance coverage offers are likely to 
have partners with comparable quality job offers.  Overall, the model offers a good specification, 
as suggested by the Log Likelihood and LR test of the independence of the equations in the 
model.   
Focusing on the motherhood wage gap, which in Table 4 is captured by the single 
motherhood dummy and in Table 5 by the combination motherhood dummies, we find evidence 
of a motherhood wage gap for mothers in jobs with health insurance offers, even after accounting 
for this job sector self-selection.  In contrast, we find no evidence of a motherhood wage gap 
among women in jobs lacking employer-based health insurance offers after taking into 
consideration their self-selection into such jobs.  As a result, the motherhood wage penalty of 
mothers with an employer health insurance offer is significantly larger than for mothers without 
such an offer (i.e. as expected: |δ1|>|δ2|); furthermore, this difference seems to be driving the 
average estimates of the motherhood wage gap found in our baseline results and in other studies.  
Our finding is suggestive of a compensating wage differential story; namely, that mothers who 
obtain jobs in the “good” job sector are trading off wages for health insurance offers and it is this 
CWD trade-off that is driving the overall motherhood wage gap.  This is consistent with the 
findings of both Felfe’s (2007) results using German data and Nielsen et al.’s (2004) findings 
using Danish data.  Note that this CWD argument for the sector-specific motherhood wage gap 
exists despite the results shown in Columns 1 of Tables 4 and 5 in which motherhood is 
associated with a lower overall likelihood of employment in the health insurance job sector.     
Finally, the correlation coefficient Rho1 in both tables is negative and statistically 
different from zero, signaling that women in jobs offering health insurance would earn higher 17 
wages had they chosen jobs not offering such benefit.  In other words, women offered health 
insurance at work pay a compensating wage differential for such a benefit, whereas women 
working for employers who do not offer health insurance do no better or worse than a random 
working mother from the sample.  This evidence suggests further that the motherhood wage gap 
estimates much discussed in the economics literature originate, at least in part, from a 
compensating differential for employment-based health insurance.   
The remaining coefficient estimates presented in Table 4 and Table 5 reveal some 
interesting differences according to whether or not women are offered health insurance at work.  
For example, age is a statistically positive predictor of wages for working women with health 
insurance offers but not for their counterparts lacking such offers.  Mothers with health 
limitations suffer a much smaller wage penalty when they acquire “good” jobs (i.e., those with 
health insurance offers), than with suffer a penalty if they get “bad” jobs (4 percent versus 18 
percent wage penalty).  Additionally, mothers who reside in areas with relatively higher local 
unemployment rates earn lower wages much more so when employed in the “bad” job sector (3 
percent versus 7 percent).  Finally, residing in the South is associated with lower wages only in 
the case of “good” jobs, perhaps due to a weaker union presence in the South. 
As is the case with all empirical research, the analysis carried out presents some caveats.  
We have chosen to focus on the self-selection of women into a particular type of job and, 
therefore, on the endogeneity of having an employment-based health insurance offer.  As such, 
we have estimated an endogenous switching regression model to address these problems as well 
as the distinct wage structure characterizing jobs offering health insurance.  However, owing to 
this model’s complexity, we have not addressed two other issues sometimes addressed by the 
motherhood wage gap literature.  First, we have not taken into account the endogeneity of 18 
motherhood.  As noted by Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel (2005), it is difficult to find 
appropriate instruments for becoming a mother owing to the fact that motherhood and 
employment decisions are made by the same individual.  In any event, it is worth noting that 
previous studies have shown that instrumenting for motherhood only serves to widen the 
motherhood wage gap estimates, not to diminish them.   
Additionally, as discussed at the beginning of this study, a second concern in the 
motherhood wage gap literature is the role played by individual level heterogeneity.  Several 
papers on the motherhood wage gap (including Anderson et al. (2002 and 2003), Waldfogel 
(1997 and 1998), and Budig and England (2001)) rely on panel data techniques to address the 
likely heterogeneity in their samples.  We do not allow for individual level fixed effects owing to 
the complexity of incorporating this extension in the context of an endogeneous switching 
regression model.  However, we do adjust our standard errors to allow for clustering at the 
individual level.  Furthermore, it is worth noting that, to the extent that accounting for individual 
fixed effects does not appreciably alter the estimates of the motherhood wage gap (see, for 
example, Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel 2005), our results can be regarded as reliable evidence 
of the contribution of employment-based health insurance offers to the motherhood wage gap.   
VII. Summary   
Many hypotheses have been offered to date as explanations for the observed wage gap 
between mothers and non-mothers.  Inspired by the hedonic wage model, we hypothesize that 
relatively lower wages for mothers reflect a compensating wage differential that adjusts for a 
preference for the non-wage benefit of employer-provided health insurance coverage.  We test 
this hypothesis by estimating an endogenous switching regression wage model in which the 
switching mechanism is the observed offer of employer health insurance coverage.  We find that, 19 
once the endogeneity of the health insurance offer –partially originating in the self-selection of 
women into a particular type of job– is accounted for, mothers holding these “good” jobs earn 
less than their female non-mother counterparts, ceteris paribus. Thus, the much-reported 
motherhood wage gap appears to originate, at least in part, from a negative compensating wage 
differential arising from a relative preference on the part of mothers for an important component 
of non-wage compensation, namely, health insurance coverage.  This finding prevails despite 
mothers’ overall reduced likelihood of receiving offers of employer health insurance coverage. 
This conclusion has relevance for the policy discussion concerning the motherhood wage gap, as 
it suggests a different source of this wage differential and reinforces the importance of job sector 
choice in driving that gap.  Additionally, our finding provides an explanation for the larger 
motherhood wage gap observed in the United States (relative to other developed countries) as 
noted by Todd (2001). 
Where does this new empirical finding leave us?  First, our findings, as well as those of 
Felfe (2007) and Nielsen et al. (2004), suggest that future studies of the role of motherhood in 
determining wages ought to focus on a broader assortment of job characteristics, not just wages.  
Increased availability of data sets including not only information on the offer of health insurance 
at work, but also on the generosity of the health plan, could be used to produce precise estimates 
of the wage-fringe trade-off in women’s job choices.  Second, a more explicit incorporation of 
individual level heterogeneity might improve our understanding of the role of motherhood in the 
structure of compensation packages and the trade-off between wage and non-wage 
compensation.  In any event, it is apparent that the choice of job sector, as manifested in our case 
by the employer’s offer of health insurance, plays an important role in wage determination, 
particularly for mothers. 
 20 
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Table 1 
Variables, Means, and Standard Deviations as of 2004 
 
Variable Name  Variable Description  Without HI  With HI 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Real Hourly Wage  Real hourly wages (1984-1986 dollars)  5.87  4.21  9.68  11.18 
Age  Age  of  respondent  43.21 2.14 43.09 2.25 
White Race  dummy  0.67 0.47 0.62 0.49 
Hispanic Race  dummy  0.06 0.25 0.06 0.23 
Black Race  dummy  0.27 0.44 0.32 0.47 
Health Limitations  Dummy variable indicative of health limitations  0.12  0.32  0.05  0.22 
Married  Marital  status  dummy  0.60 0.49 0.55 0.50 
Motherhood  Dummy equal to 1 if woman is a mother  0.75  0.43  0.73  0.45 
One child  Dummy equal to q if woman only has one child  0.29  0.45  0.28  0.45 
Two or more children  Dummy equal to 1 if woman has two kids or more  0.46  0.50  0.44  0.50 
Less than High School  Educational attainment dummy  0.13  0.34  0.06  0.24 
High School  Educational attainment dummy  0.44  0.50  0.42  0.49 
Some College  Educational attainment dummy  0.27  0.45  0.31  0.46 
College  Educational  attainment  dummy  0.16 0.37 0.21 0.41 
Tenure  Tenure  in  weeks  222.47 251.90 403.66 342.40 
Professional  &  Managers  Occupation  dummy  0.29 0.46 0.40 0.49 
Sales  Occupation  dummy  0.05 0.21 0.04 0.20 
Clerical Occupation  dummy  0.22 0.41 0.29 0.45 
Craftsmen  Occupation  dummy  0.04 0.20 0.03 0.16 
Operatives  Occupation  dummy  0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29 
Laborers  Occupation  dummy  0.04 0.20 0.02 0.13 
Farm  Occupation  dummy  0.01 0.08 0.01 0.03 
Services  Occupation  dummy  0.26 0.44 0.12 0.33 
Part-time Work  Part-time work dummy  0.30  0.46  0.15  0.36 
Urban  Equal to 1 if respondent lives in an urban area  0.75  0.47  0.81  0.45 
High Unemployment Rate  Equal to 1 if respondent lives in high unemployment area  0.02  0.15  0.02  0.15 
North  Central  Regional  dummy  0.23 0.42 0.24 0.43 
Northeast  Regional  dummy  0.17 0.37 0.18 0.38 
South  Regional  dummy  0.43 0.50 0.42 0.49 
West  Regional  dummy  0.17 0.38 0.16 0.37 




Difference-in-Difference Estimates  
Panel A: 
  Mothers Non-Mothers ∆ (Mothers vs. Non-mothers) 
Without HCI  1.51 (0.61)  1.52 (0.71)  -0.0139 (0.0193) 
With HCI  1.90 (0.57)  2.04 (0.57)  -0.1483 (0.0096)***
 
Diff-in-diff -  -  -0.1344 (0.0215)***
 
Panel B: 
  Mothers with One Kid  Non-Mothers  ∆ (Mothers with One Kid vs. Non-mothers) 
Without HCI  1.55 (0.59)  1.52 (0.71)  0.0260 (0.0230 
With HCI  1.93 (0.56)  2.04 (0.57)  -0.1137 (0.0119)***
 
Diff-in-diff -  -  -0.1397 (0.0259)***
 
Panel C: 
  Mothers with Two Plus Kids  Non-Mothers  ∆ (Mothers with Two Plus Kids vs. Non-mothers) 
Without HCI  1.49 (0.61)  1.52 (0.71)  -0.0296 (0.0200 
With HCI  1.88 (0.58)  2.04 (0.57)  -0.1674 (0.0105)***
 
Diff-in-diff -  -  -0.1377 (0.0226)***
 




Baseline Estimates of the Motherhood Wage Gap 
Panel A: Full Sample of Working Women 
Key Independent Variables  Coefficient  S.E.  Regression Fit Statistics 
       
Motherhood  -0.0570***  0.0086  N = 19295  F(25,19269) = 327.77 
        
One Child  -0.0308***  0.0103  N = 19295  F(26, 19268) = 316.31 
Two Plus Children  -0.0746***  0.0094     
        
Panel B: Working Women Lacking Employment-Based Health Insurance Offers  
Key Independent Variables  Coefficient  S.E.  Regression Fit Statistics 
       
Motherhood  -0.0267  0.0196  N = 4953  F(25,4927) = 52.83 
        
One Child  0.0127  0.0238  N = 4953  F(26,4926) = 51.20 
Two Plus Children  -0.0463**  0.0207     
        
Panel C: Working Women with Employment-Based Health Insurance Offers 
Key Independent Variables  Coefficient  S.E.  Regression Fit Statistics 
       
Motherhood  -0.0510***  0.0093  N = 14282  F(25,14256) = 227.86 
        
One Child  -0.0378***  0.0111  N = 18334  F(26,14255) = 219.34 
Two Plus Children  -0.0607***  0.0103     
        
Notes: All equations include a constant.  *** Signifies statistically different from zero at the 1% level 
or better and **at the 5% level or better.   26 
Table 4 
Motherhood Wage Gap by Offer of Employer-Provided Health Care Insurance  
(First Motherhood Specification) 
 
Independent Variables 
Health Insurance Offer 
Equation 
Wage Equation for Women 
with Health Insurance 
Wage Equation for Women 
without Health Insurance 
Coefficient S.E.  Coefficient S.E.  Coefficient  S.E. 
Age 0.1413***  0.0397  0.0386**  0.0159  0.0231  0.0388 
Age Squared  -0.0019***  0.0006  -0.0004**  0.0002  -0.0003  0.0005 
Hispanic -0.0389  0.0802  -0.0072  0.0299  0.0102  0.0586 
Black 0.1329***  0.0421  -0.1016***  0.0165  -0.0986***  0.0303 
Health Limitations  -0.2258***  0.0576  -0.0443*  0.0300  -0.1835***  0.0489 
Married 0.0122  0.0342  0.0192*  0.0129  0.0406**  0.0211 
Motherhood -0.1584***  0.0455  -0.0328***  0.0166  -0.0163  0.0366 
Less than High School  -0.2903***  0.0555  -0.1252***  0.0271  -0.1090**  0.0501 
Some College  0.0821***  0.0408  0.1561***  0.0153  0.1363***  0.0254 
College 0.0958**  0.0562  0.3901***  0.0231  0.3575***  0.0444 
Tenure 0.0030***  0.0002  0.0004***  0.0001  0.0008**  0.0004 
Tenure Squared  1.84e-06 ***  1.75e-07  -1.36e-07  1.05e-07  0.0000**  0.0000 
Professional & Managers  0.6851***  0.0472  0.2467***  0.0420  0.2311***  0.0859 
Sales 0.4068***  0.0705  0.1780***  0.0428  0.0473  0.0696 
Clerical 0.6021***  0.0480  0.0961***  0.0372  0.0698  0.0720 
Craftsmen 0.4332***  0.0550  0.1365***  0.0313  0.0345  0.0538 
Operatives 0.7326***  0.0670  0.0247  0.0420  -0.0029  0.0828 
Laborers  0.4052*** 0.0869 -0.0185  0.0357  -0.1686**  0.0913 
Farm -0.7576***  0.2425  0.1617  0.1565  -0.0250  0.1259 
Part-time Work  -0.5508***  0.0299  0.0344  0.0300  0.0373  0.0696 
Urban 0.0480  0.0381  0.0575***  0.0148  0.1003***  0.0204 
High Unemployment Rate  -0.1065**  0.0453  -0.0229*  0.0178  -0.0700***  0.0289 
Northeast 0.0172  0.0564  0.1595***  0.0222  0.1689***  0.0336 
South 0.1229***  0.0455  -0.0361**  0.0185  -0.0073  0.0343 
West 0.1382***  0.0565  0.0896***  0.0228  0.1195***  0.0403 
% of Employed HH Members  0.1033***  0.0375  -  -  -  - 
      
Regression Fit Statistics 
N 19235 









LR test of indep. eqns. :  Chi2 (1) = 4.64 
Prob > Chi2  0.0312 
Notes: All equations include a constant.  *** Signifies statistically different from zero at the 1% level or better, **at the 5% 
level or better and *at the 10% level or better.  Reference categories: White, High School, Services, and North Central. 27 
Table 5 
Motherhood Wage Gap by Offer of Employer-Provided Health Care Insurance  
(Second Motherhood Specification) 
 
Independent Variables 
Health Insurance Offer 
Equation 
Wage Equation for Women 
with Health Insurance 
Wage Equation for Women 
without Health Insurance 
Coefficient S.E.  Coefficient S.E.  Coefficient  S.E. 
Age 0.1544***  0.0402  0.0399**  0.0163  0.0297  0.0362 
Age Squared  -0.0021***  0.0006  -0.0005**  0.0002  -0.0004  0.0005 
Hispanic -0.0318  0.0780  -0.0066  0.0299  0.0130  0.0592 
Black 0.1407***  0.0423  -0.1008***  0.0167  -0.0944***  0.0281 
Health Limitations  -0.2329  0.0570  -0.0451*  0.0302  -0.1889***  0.0480 
Married 0.0217  0.0342  0.0201*  0.0130  0.0461***  0.0206 
One Child  -0.0877**  0.0477  -0.0280***  0.0171  0.0174  0.0319 
Two Plus Children  -0.2195***  0.0513  -0.0373***  0.0193  -0.0362  0.0350 
Less than High School  -0.2859***  0.0556  -0.1254***  0.0272  -0.1097***  0.0421 
Some College  0.0779**  0.0408  0.1559***  0.0153  0.1361***  0.0250 
College 0.0888*  0.0563  0.3895***  0.0232  0.3569***  0.0431 
Tenure 0.0030***  0.0002  0.0004***  0.0001  0.0008***  0.0003 
Tenure Squared  -1.82e-06***  1.75e-07  -1.37e-07  1.05e-07  -6.85e-07***  2.69e-07 
Professional & Managers  0.6835***  0.0472  0.2475***  0.0426  0.2377***  0.0633 
Sales 0.4028***  0.0706  0.1783***  0.0430  0.0492  0.0601 
Clerical 0.6008***  0.0480  0.0967***  0.0377  0.0766*  0.0525 
Craftsmen 0.4289***  0.0550  0.1373***  0.0316  0.0354  0.0417 
Operatives 0.7347***  0.0673  0.0259  0.0427  0.0052  0.0621 
Laborers  0.4063*** 0.0869 -0.0180  0.0360  -0.1638***  0.0836 
Farm -0.7566***  0.2405  0.1554  0.1568  -0.0246  0.1189 
Part-time Work  -0.5479***  0.0299  0.0337  0.0303  0.0332***  0.0509 
Urban 0.0453  0.0381  0.0574***  0.0148  0.0997***  0.0201 
High Unemployment Rate  -0.1022***  0.0453  -0.0225  0.0177  -0.0697***  0.0270 
Northeast 0.0141  0.0565  0.1598***  0.0222  0.1654  0.0332 
South 0.1148***  0.0457  -0.0363***  0.0185  -0.0094***  0.0318 
West 0.1337***  0.0566  0.0899***  0.0228  0.1179  0.0382 
% of Employed HH Members  0.0858**  0.0378  -  -  -  - 
      
Regression Fit Statistics 
N 19235 









LR test of indep. eqns. :  Chi2 (1) = 4.35 
Prob > Chi2  0.0371 
Notes: All equations include a constant.  *** Signifies statistically different from zero at the 1% level or better, **at the 
5% level or better and *at the 10% level or better.  Reference categories: White, High School, Services, and North Central. 